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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on climatic variability and food security. It 
analyzes the effect of climatic shocks on food security for 77 developing countries from 1960 
to 2008. Using two complementary indicators of food security (food supply, proportion of 
undernourished people), we find that climatic shocks reduce food supply in developing 
countries. The adverse effect is higher for African Sub Saharan countries than other 
developing countries. Second, food supply is a channel by which climatic shocks increase the 
proportion of undernourished people.  Third, the negative effects of climatic shocks are 
exacerbated in presence of civil conflicts and are high for countries that are vulnerable to food 
prices shocks.  
 
JEL Codes: D74;Q17; Q18 ; Q54   
Keywords: Civil conflicts; Food Prices shocks; Food security; Climatic shocks 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 PhD student at Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International 
(CERDI), 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France. Tel: 0033667250030. E-mail address : 
Felix.Badolo1@u-clermont1.fr  
2  Centre d’Etude et de recherche sur le Développement International (CERDI), University of 
Auvergne, 65 Bd François Mitterand, 63000 Clermont Ferrand, France.  
Email :somlanare.kinda@udamail.fr or kindaromuald@gmail.com  
 2 
1. Introduction 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (2011), between 1990 and 
2005 the number of people living under the international poverty3 has reduced from 1.8 
billion to 1.4billion.  These results confirm some previous studies (Chen & Ravallion 2010) 
that conclude to a continued decline in global poverty during the last three decade. These 
authors show that the proportion of the world people living below the international poverty is 
gone from 52 percent in 1980 to 25 percent in 2005. However, progress is currently not fast 
enough and different with regions. From 1980 to 2005, the poverty rate in East Asia fell from 
80% to 20 % and stayed at around 50 % in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite national and 
international efforts in poverty reducing, the number of people suffering from chronic hunger 
has risen from 815 million in 1990 to 1.023 million in 2009 (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 2009) and a significant proportion of households 
dependent on agriculture are still exposed to the risks of food shortages and hunger.  
There is a growing consensus in the scientific literature that the implications of climate 
change (higher temperatures, rainfall variability) might be major concerns to humanity since it 
affect many economic sectors as well as different aspects of human life. This is particularly 
true in low-income countries because these countries have low adaptive capacities and their 
economy is largely based on weather-sensitive agricultural production systems.  
Many authors have analyzed the link between climate change and food security. Two 
groups of articles can be put forward. The first one concerns theoretical papers.  Several 
theoretical analyzes conclude that climate change have negative impact on agricultural 
production and decreases national food availability. (Christensen et al. 2007)  show that food 
production remains highly vulnerable to the influence of adverse weather conditions. 
(Menghestab Haile 2005) and (Dilley et al. 2005) confirm that the recent food crises in Africa 
that required large-scale external food aid have been attributed fully and partially to extreme 
weather events. (Ringler, Zhu, et al. 2010) conclude that climate change is a factor of 
childhood malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second one is empirical papers. Because 
of an absence of suitable data, empirical economic studies are rare. Using panel data for Asian 
countries from 1998 to 2007, (Lee et al. 2012) show that high temperature and more 
precipitations in summer increase agricultural production while high fall temperatures are 
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harmful. (von Braun 1991) concludes in the case of Ethiopia that a 10% decrease in the 
amount of rainfall below the long run average leads to 4.4% reduction in the food production.    
Despite these previous studies, little is known about mechanisms by which climatic 
shocks can affect food insecurity. This paper makes an empirical contribution to the debate on 
the causal effect of climate change on food security. It, explicitly, investigates the effects of 
climatic shocks on food security. We use panel data from 1960 to 2008 for 77 countries and 
alternative econometric methods (Fixed effects, Random effects). The results are as follows: 
First, we show that climatic shocks have negative effects on food security.  Using two 
complementary indicators of food security, we find that climatic shocks reduce food supply in 
developing countries. The adverse effect is higher for African Sub Saharan countries than 
other developing countries.  Moreover, food supply is a channel by which climatic shocks 
increase the proportion of undernourished people.  Second, the negative effect of climatic 
shocks is exacerbated in presence of civil conflicts. Third, the effects are high for countries 
that vulnerable to food prices shocks. We contribute to the existing literature on climate 
variability and food security in several ways. First, while most of the literature is mainly 
theoretical, we apply an empirical method for 77 developing countries.  Second, we employ 
climate variability data (rainfall shocks) from two different sources.   
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on the 
relationship between climatic shocks and food security. Section 3 derives estimating 
equations and whereas section 4 shows empirical results. The last is devoted to concluding 
remarks and implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section defines the concept of food security and gives an overview on the 
determinants of food security. It discusses on the effects of climatic shocks on food security.   
2.1. Concept of Food security 
 
2.1.1.Definition 
Food security is a concept multidimensional and flexible that gained prominence since 
the World Food Conference in 1974. Many definitions of the concept have been developed 
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(see Maxwell, 1996) as it has shifted from food production and importing capabilities at the 
macro-level to focus on individuals and their ability to avoid hunger and undernutrition 
(Foster, 1992). According to Reutlinger (1986), food security is defined as "access by all 
people at all times to enough food for an active healthy life". This definition is widely 
accepted by the World Bank and nongovernmental organizations. For the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP, 1994) food security means that all people at all times have 
both physical and economic access to basic food. This requires not just enough food to go 
around. It requires that people have ready access to food-that they have an "entitlement" to 
food, by growing it for themselves, by buying it or by taking advantage of a public food 
distribution system. 
Such a definition highlights the importance of food security as a basic human right 
(see e.g. Dreze and Sen, 1989; Sen, 1981, 1995). Tweeten (1997) emphasizes that the concept 
of food has three essential dimensions. The first dimension is food availability that refers to 
the supply of foodstuffs in a country from production or imports. This first dimension 
highlights the fact that there is a "bread basket" of food available for a population to consume, 
but it says nothing about how it is distributed. The second dimension is food access that refers 
to the ability to acquire food for consumption through purchase, production or public 
assistance. Indeed, food may be available but not necessarily accessible. The thirst dimension 
is food utilization, which concerns the physical use of food derived from human distribution. 
Food may be available to individuals who have access, but health problems may result from 
the imbalanced diet of food that is consumed. 
2.1.2. Measures  
Several indicators have been defined in literature for measuring the concept of food 
insecurity at the macroeconomic level. The first indicators used in literature on food 
insecurity are the energy balance per capita which is measured by the Dietary Energy Supply 
and the headcount rate of poverty defined as the proportion of people with an income below 
one dollar per day. The energy balance is a measure of national food availability that help to 
know how food supply of a country meets the energy needs of its population under the 
hypothesis that the food supply is distributed among individuals according to needs. For 
people who have an income below one dollar per day are likely to face problems of food 
access. These two indicators are considered as the partial measures of food security because 
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they take into account two dimensions of food security: food supply for the energy balance 
and food access for the headcount rate of poverty.  
Some authors (e.g. Maxwell et al.; 1992) use the mortality rate of children less than five 
years, the child malnutrition and the proportion of undernourished. The mortality rate of 
children under the age of five partially reflects the fatal synergy between inadequate dietary 
intake and unhealthy environments. It gives an idea of severity of food insecurity. The child 
malnutrition measures the prevalence of underweight in children under the age of five, 
indicating the proportion of children suffering from weight loss. The proportion of 
undernourished reflects the share of the population with insufficient dietary energy intake. 
Contrary to the previous indicators that covers a category of population (children), the 
proportion of undernourished is considered to be close to the definition of food insecurity.  
Recent analyzes refer to Global Hunger Index (GHI)4 to measure food insecurity. GHI 
is a statistical tool to measure and monitor hunger in the world by country and by region. It 
captures three dimensions of hunger: insufficient availability of food, shortfalls in the 
nutritional status of children, and child mortality, which is to a large extent attributable to 
under-nutrition. Accordingly, GHI includes the following three equally weighted indicators: 
the proportion of undernourished, the prevalence of underweight in children under the age of 
five, and the under-five mortality rate. It integrates different aspects of multifaceted 
phenomena like hunger and under-nutrition, reduces the impact of random measurement 
errors, and facilitates the use of statistics by policymakers and the public by condensing 
information. The Global Hunger Index ranks countries on a 100-point scale, with 0 being the 
best score (no hunger) and 100 being the worst. In general, values greater than 10 indicate a 
serious problem of hunger, values greater than 20 are alarming, and values exceeding 30 are 
extremely alarming. It seems to be the best indicator to measure food security. However, the 
use of this indicator for econometric analyses is problematic because it is not available over a 
long time. 
2.2 What could explain food insecurity? 
In the literature on food insecurity three approaches have been developed to highlight the 
explanatory factors of food insecurity: the production-based approach, the market-based 
approach and institutional failures.  
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2.2.1. The production-based approach 
The production-based approach is based on the assumption that the food insecurity is the 
result of a food availability decline (FAD). This approach is often based on analysis of the 
relation between the relationship between population growth and the ability of humans to 
confront scarcity of food and natural resources which has dominated the literature on food 
security (see for example Berry and Cline, 1979; Boserup, 1965, 1981; Cohen, 1965; Ehrlich 
et al. 1993; Smil, 1994). Indeed, when a country makes the transition from agriculture to 
industry, it faces to urbanization problem, demographic change, and effects of this transition 
on the environment. Harper (1996) thinks that, in these circumstances, food security can be 
maintained only through efforts to achieve a sustainable society that “meets the needs of the 
human population without compromising those of future generations”.  
The Malthusian and techno-ecological theories offer much information on population impacts 
on environment and threats to food security. In his book, Malthus (1798) thinks that the 
expansion of population follows a geometric progression whereas the food supply grows an 
arithmetic progression, and concludes that population growth outstrips the earth’s ability to 
provide for its inhabitants. The Malthusian’ theory has been strengthened by neo-Malthusians 
(see for example Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990; Ophuls and Boyan, 1992). These authors 
conclude that population growth is a threat to food security because it leads to a decrease in 
food availability. This decrease is intensified by problems of access and utilization of 
foodstuffs, which are exacerbated by the increasing scarcity. Food availability is at the core of 
environmentalism and needs to conserve resources. Therefore, sustainable methods of food 
production and economic development are essential. On this point, neo-Malthusians (see for 
example Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990) argue against “infinite substitutability” of the earth’s 
resources, emphasizing the limits of adaptation to environmental change but demanding 
people to modify current patterns of consumption.  
Contrary to neo-Malthusians, the techno-ecological theories believe that technology and 
human ingenuity have always adequately confronted existing scarcities and will continue to 
do so in the future. Following this idea, Boserup (1965) concludes that developing countries 
address urbanization problem and population growth by adapting new technologies and 
strategies of land-use intensification. Going in the same direction as Boserup, Simon (1981, 
1990) suggests that population growth should not be considered a threat but an asset because 
humans are the most valuable natural resource for their problem-solving capabilities. Some 
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authors, in addition technology, take into account political and economic actions in the 
relationship between population growth and food security. Cohen (1995) thinks that rational 
political and economic actions as well as utilization of science and technology contribute to 
efficiency in food production and distribution systems, thus reducing threats to food security. 
The authors as Tweeten and McClelland (1997) and Bongaarts suggest that effective trade 
policy and improvement in access to markets will help to limit food insecurity. For example, 
an increase in agricultural production or better food distribution via a good transport 
infrastructure may offset negative effects of population growth by increasing food availability 
and food access. In conclusion, infrastructural development and advances in technology must 
be adapted to meeting challenges of growing populations and diminishing resources.    
2.2.2. The market-based approach  
The market-based approach is based on the idea that famine is not due to the supply of food 
but due to the access to food. The concept of entitlement developed par Sen (1978, 1981) 
joined in part this approach. The author thinks that people have an entitlement to food. The 
concept of entitlement is defined as the set of all possible combinations of goods and services 
that a person can obtain using the totality of rights and opportunities. Entitlements depend 
mainly on two factors that are personal endowments and exchange conditions. The 
endowments are the combination of all resources legally owned by people, which include both 
tangible assets (such as land, equipment, animals, etc.) and intangibles such as knowledge and 
skill, labor power, membership of a particular community, etc. In developing countries, an 
important part of household’s resources comes from labor activities.  In other words, people’s 
endowments are based on the revenues of employment and the possible earnings by selling 
non labor-assets. Exchange conditions allow people to use their resources to access the set of 
commodities through trade and production and the determination of relative prices of products 
or goods. Sen (1981, 2000) concludes later that an unfavorable shift in exchange conditions 
can be factors of food insecurity. Otherwise, a general shortfall of employment in the 
economy reduces the people’ ability to acquire an adequate amount of food.  In other words a 
change in relative prices of products or wage rate vis-à-vis food price can cause food 
insecurity.  
They also find in the market-based approach of food security the studies on the relationship 
between economic performance and food insecurity. A poor economic performance can be a 
major cause of poverty. A person is considered to be in absolute poverty when he or she is 
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unable to satisfy adequately his or her basic needs such as food, health, water, shelter, primary 
education, and community participation (Frankenberger 1996). The effects of poverty on 
hunger and undernutrition are pervasive. Poor households and individuals are unable to 
achieve food security, have inadequate resources for care, and are not able to utilize resources 
for health on a sustainable basis. In contrast, a sustained economic growth has a positive 
direct impact on food security by supporting agricultural production and hence food supply. 
Wiesmann (2006) suggests that national incomes are central to food security and nutrition 
because household food security, knowledge, and caring capacity as well as health 
environments require a range of goods and services to be produced by the national economy 
or to be purchased on international markets. Using the Global Hunger Index (GHI) as measure 
of food security and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, the author shows that the 
availability of economic resources at the national level largely determines the extent of hunger 
and undernutrition. Poor countries tend to have high GHI values. 
Smith and Haddad (2000) think that national income may enhance countries’ health 
environments and services as well as women’s education by increasing government budgets. 
It may also boost national food availability by improving resources available for purchasing 
food on international markets, and, for countries with large agricultural sectors, it reflects the 
contribution of food production to overall income generated by households. The authors 
suggest also that national income may improve women’s relative status directly by freeing up 
resources for improving women’s lives as well as men’s. The authors conclude that there is a 
strong negative relationship between national incomes and poverty, as shown by the recent 
studies (see e.g., Ravallion 2005; Easterly, 2007 Roemer and Gugerty 1997). These studies 
show that economic growth is necessary condition for poverty reduction. By promoting 
poverty reduction, economic growth may reduce the constraints on access to food for 
households and is therefore a source food security.    
2.2.3. Institutional failures 
Some authors (Keen, 1994, Devereux, 2001 and Sen, 1999) have put in light the importance 
of institutions as explanation of food insecurity. According to them the failure to deliver food 
can be due to the implementation of inappropriate policies or a failure to intervene by 
governments and the existence of civil conflicts.  
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Sen (1999) suggests that the working democracy and of political rights can help to prevent 
famines and other economic disasters. Indeed, authoritarian rulers tend to lack the incentives 
to take timely preventive measures. In contrast, democratic governments have to win elections 
and face public criticism, and have strong incentives to undertake measures to avert food 
insecurity and other catastrophes. For example, democracy can provide some empowerment 
through voting by the poor to receive human resource investments in health, education, and 
food transfers from government for broad-based development. In absence of elections, of 
opposition parties and of scope for uncensored public criticism, authoritarian governments 
don’t have to suffer the political consequences of their failure to prevent food insecurity. 
However, democracy would spread the penalty of food insecurity to the ruling groups and 
political leaders. This gives them the political incentive to try to prevent any threatening food 
insecurity. Sen also thinks that a free press and the practice of democracy contribute greatly to 
bringing out information that can have an enormous impact on policies for food insecurity 
prevention (for example, information about the nature and impact of new production 
techniques on food supply). The author concludes that a free press and an active political 
opposition constitute the best early-warning system a country threatened by famines can have.  
Smith and Haddad (2000) think that democracy is hypothesized to play a major role in food 
insecurity reducing. According to these authors, a more democratic government affects large 
revenues in education, health services, and income redistribution. This contributes to reduce 
the problems of food insecurity in the areas affected. Smith and Haddad also suggest that a 
more democratic government may be more likely to respond to the needs of all of its citizens, 
women’s as well as men’s. With respect to food security, the analyses of Drèze and Sen 
(1989) and others conclude that democracy is very important in averting food insecurity. 
More democratic governments may be more likely to honor human rights including the rights 
to food and nutrition (Haddad and Oshaug 1998) and to encourage community participation 
(Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett 1995), both of which may be important means for reducing 
child malnutrition. 
Otherwise, other studies have established a link between civil conflicts and hunger. Indeed, in 
countries in conflict, population, households and individuals suffer disruptions in livelihoods, 
assets, nutrition and health. Combatants frequently use hunger as a weapon by cutting off 
food supplies and productive capacities, starving opposing populations into submission, and 
hijacking food aid intended for civilians. Warfare disrupts markets and destroys crops, 
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livestock, roads, and land. Deliberate asset-stripping of households in conflict zones may 
cause those households to lose other sources of livelihood as the ongoing conflict leads to 
breakdowns in production, trade, and the social networks. The disruption of markets, schools, 
and infrastructure removes additional resources required for food production, distribution, 
safety, and household livelihoods. These consequences lead to aggravate food insecurity in 
countries in conflicts.  
Green and Mavie (1994) show that the cumulative loss of output attributable to the 1982-1992 
civil conflict in Mozambique exceeded $20 billion. The authors also conclude that this 
conflict removed over half of the country’s population from customary livelihoods and 
devastated markets, communications, health services and infrastructure. Messer, Cohen and 
D’Costa (1998) have estimated the extent of food production losses due to conflict by 
examining trends in war-torn countries of sub-Saharan Africa during 1970-1994 and find that 
food production was lower in war years by a mean of 12.3 percent. This decrease in food 
production has the significant impacts on food availability because in these countries, a 
majority of the workforce earns its livelihood from agriculture. In addition, in eight of the 
countries, two-thirds or more of the workforce is engaged in agricultural activities (World 
Bank, 2000). 
2.3. How do climatic shocks matter for food insecurity? 
In this subsection we identify the potential channels through which climatic variability 
(e.g. droughts, rainfall and temperature volatility) is likely to affect food security in 
developing countries.   
Climatic shocks and agriculture production 
First, in short term, rainfall volatility affects food security through its impact on crop 
production. Droughts and floods impact negatively farm yields and the harvests, reducing 
household and national food availability, and agricultural income. Poor harvests threaten food 
security; to varying degrees according to the extent that country depends to agriculture for its 
food and income. In the longer term, (Kydd et al. 2004) think that weather risks (for example 
rainfall volatility) contribute to underinvestment and hence to long-run agricultural stagnation 
and rural poverty in countries that are dependent on rainfed agricultural. This leads to a 
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decrease in food availability and limits food accessibility because of the decrease in income 
derived from crop sales.  
Climatic shocks and households incomes 
Second, rainfall volatility (droughts or floods) affects food security through household 
incomes. According to (International Labor Organization 2007), agriculture production is the 
primary source of livehoods for 36% (66%) of the world’s (Sub-saharan Africa respectively) 
total working population. By reducing agriculture production, climatic shocks reduce the 
households’ incomes coming from agriculture sector. Beyond the agriculture sector, (Sen 
1983) considers that climatic shocks affect rural labor markets. By reducing incomes, climatic 
shocks (for example drought) reduce the demand for goods and services in affected 
communities, threatening the livelihoods of people who depend on indirectly on agriculture 
such as traders. In other words, when agricultural production in developing countries 
(especially in low income countries) is negatively affected by climatic shocks, households’ 
incomes are reduced and their vulnerability to food insecurity increases. (Nhemachena et al. 
2010) show that climatic variability (rainfall and temperature) adversely affect net farm 
revenues (from crop and livestock across various farm types and systems) translating into 
worsening food security situation in Africa. 
Climatic shocks and food prices 
Climatic shocks impact food security through its strongly negative effect on food 
prices. Indeed, weather shock that undermines the harvests, leads to food availability decline. 
Since the demand for food is highly price inelastic, a decrease in marketed supplies can lead 
to an important increase in food prices, reducing food accessibility. Moreover, (Aker 2010) 
considers that climatic shocks can have an effect on traders’ entry and exit, in response to the 
profitability of food trading. A positive (or negative) climatic shock can increase (or reduce) 
profits and incite traders to entry (or exit) local market. This can affect food supply in the 
local market and food security through food price dispersion. Using theoretical models 
(simulating model, global circulation model and a equilibrium general model),  Ringler et al. 
(2010) find that climatic variability (higher temperatures and mixed precipitation changes)  
will lead to changes in yield and area growth, higher food prices and therefore lower 
affordability of food, reduced calorie availability, and growing childhood malnutrition in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
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Climatic shocks and economic resources 
Climatic shocks can impact food security through economic growth. (Dell et al. 2008) 
show that climatic shocks have large and negative effects on economic growth in poor 
countries, reducing total productivity  and global output (through agricultural yields, 
investments, scientific research and political stability). By affecting negatively economic 
growth, climatic shocks also reduce economic resources. Hence, they affect the ability of 
countries to: (i) purchase food on international markets; (ii) to invest in technology, services 
and infrastructure that support food and agricultural production; (iii) to finance public services 
and investments in health, education available to the governments to meet the needs of its 
population such as food needs. This contributes to undermine food security. 
Climatic shocks and civil conflicts 
Climatic shocks can be a factor of food insecurity by increasing the risk of civil 
conflicts.  Some authors (see (Buhaug 2008) suppose that in long term, climate shocks will 
likely lead to greater scarcity and variability of renewable resources. By reducing available 
natural resources and households incomes, climatic shocks decrease opportunity cost of 
fighting and increase the risk of civil conflicts. The exacerbation of the scarcity of resources 
and the risk of civil war caused by climatic shocks may increase food insecurity. Other 
authors (see (Miguel et al. 2004) find that climatic shocks such as rainfall variability and 
higher temperatures are associated with less conflict.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
This section presents the empirical model of the effect of climatic shocks on food security. 
The analysis consists to specify the econometric model and describes data. 
3.1. Empirical Methodology 
The objective of our article is to analyze relationship between climatic shocks and 
food security over the period 1960-2008 for 77 developing countries. For this purpose, we use 
the following equation: 
                                    (1) 
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With X the matrix of control variables,  is the climatic shocks (rainfall instability) 
in a country (i) at a period t and our interest variable.  is the error term, is time effect and 
represents country effect. The period is 1960 to 2008 and data are compiled in five-year 
averages (1960-1964, 1965-1969,…).  is indicator of food security. We use two alternative 
measures which are food supply and the proportion of undernourished population. The control 
variables used are: the level of development measured by income per capita, population 
growth, democratic institutions.  
We identify the potential heterogeneities in the relationship between climatic shocks 
and food security. First, we focus on the impact conditional on the civil conflicts (equation 2). 
In other words, we test if the effects of climatic shocks can be different depending on whether 
the country was under conflict. Second, we analyze whether the climatic vulnerability of 
countries could modify the marginal impact of climatic shocks on food security (equation 3). 
Finally, we look at the effects of climatic shocks in a context of food prices vulnerability 
(equation 4).  
        (2) 
         (3) 
                (4) 
With : the country was under conflict;   is climatic vulnerability 
and   is the vulnerability of countries to food price shocks. 
To estimate the effect of climatic shocks on food security, we use adequate 
econometric techniques.  The model (equations (1) to (4)) is estimated with Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method.  But this estimator is biased because it does not take into account 
unobserved heterogeneity of countries. This allows us to apply Fixed Effects (FE) and 
Random Effect (RE) estimators. We use the Hausman test to choose the adequate estimator 
among the two estimators. 
3.2. The measure of food security and climatic shocks 
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Measures of food security used in the economic literature (see section 2.1.2.) are either partial 
or unavailable over a long period. For this reason, we use two complementary indicators of 
food security: food supply and proportion of undernourished in the total population.   
The instability of a variable is measured relative to a reference value. It can be defined as the 
difference between a variable and the reference value. Variance is the typical measure of 
instability. In the economic literature, the instability can be calculated with different methods 
(See annex).  We use data from Guillaumont and Simonet (2011). According to them, rainfall 
instability is defined as the absolute deviation of the yearly average of rainfall from its own 
trend (long term mean of rainfall 1960-2008).  
For robustness tests, we use an alternative indicator of rainfall instability measured by the 
standard deviation of the growth rate.  
3.3. Data sources and description of variables  
The time period under study is 1960-2008 for 77 developing countries. The data on 
population growth, income per capita, proportion of undernourished people are from World 
Development Indicators (2011). Those on democratic institutions, civil conflicts, climatic 
vulnerability, rainfall shocks and food supply come respectively from Polity IV (2010), 
(Center for Systemic Peace 2010), (Wheeler 2011), (Guillaumont & Simonet 2011) and (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2011). 
Income per capita (GDP per capita) is gross domestic product divided by population. Data on 
GDP are in constant U.S. dollars. We consider annual population growth rate. As democratic 
institutions, we choose the index of polity(2), which is a score obtained by differencing of the 
index of democracy and index of autocracy on a scale going from +10 (democracy) to -10 
(autocracy). The indicator of democracy is characterized by the effective existence of 
institutional rules framing of the power and the presence of institutions enabling citizens to 
express their expectations and choose political elites. The autocracy is characterized by the 
absence or the restriction of political competition, economic planning and control. The 
exercise of the power is slightly constrained by institutions and the leaders are only selected 
within a “political elite”. The proportion of undernourished people is the percentage of people 
not having access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life. This indicator takes into account the amount of food 
available per person nationally and the extend of inequality in access to food.  Civil conflicts 
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are defined as the magnitude score of episode(s) of civil warfare involving  that state in that year.  
Climate vulnerability is a index that show where extreme climate events (weather-related 
disasters, rising seas, and the loss of agricultural productivity) are most likely to occur, and 
the likelihood that an individual in each country would be affected. Rainfall instability is 
defined as the absolute deviation of the yearly average of rainfall from its own trend (long 
term mean of rainfall 1950-2008). 
Food supply is determined from food balance sheets produced by FAO for every country, 
charting the quantity of food available for human consumption. Food balance sheets show for 
each primary commodity and a number of processed commodities potentially available for 
human consumption the sources of supply and its utilization. The total quantity of foodstuffs 
produced in a country added to the total quantity imported and adjusted to any change in 
stocks that may have occurred since the beginning of the reference period gives the supply 
available during that period. On the utilization side a distinction is made between the 
quantities exported, fed to livestock, used for seed, processed for food use and non-food uses, 
lost during storage and transportation, and food supplies available for human consumption. 
The per capita food supply of each food item available for human consumption is then 
obtained by dividing the quantity of food item concerned on the population actually partaking 
of it. In other words, food supply is calculated as the difference between, on the one hand, 
production, the trade balance (imports – exports) and any change in stocks, and on the other 
hand, all utilizations other than human consumption (seed, livestock feed, etc.). In our paper, 
the selected commodities for the calculation of food supply are: maize, millet, rice, sorghum, 
soybeans, sugar and wheat. Food supply obtained is an arithmetic average of food supplies of 
selected commodities expressed in kcal/person/year.  
We construct the variable of vulnerability to food price shocks using the procedure developed 
by (De Janvry & Sadoulet 2008) and (Combes et al. 2012). According to the authors, 
countries are vulnerable to food price shocks if they meet the following three criteria: (1) high 
food dependency; (2) a high food import burden and (3) low income. 
High food dependency, measured by the share of total food imports in the total household 
consumption, highlights the importance of food in the basket of goods consumed by the 
representative household in a given country. A large share of food items in the basket means 
that the household will be hit by an increase in food prices. High food import burden, 
measured by the ratio of food imports to total imports, emphasizes the strong dependency of a 
 16 
country on the food imports. Level of income, measured by Gross Domestic Product per 
capita stresses the capacity of a country to constitute food safety nets for domestic consumers. 
To calculate the vulnerability index, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) applied 
to three variables: the ratio of food imports to total household, the ratio of total imports to 
total imports of goods and services and the inverse of the level of GDP per capita. We use the 
inverse of the level of GDP per capita to be sure that the level of development is negatively 
correlated to the degree of vulnerability to food price shocks. We normalize the vulnerability 
index so that it ranges between 0 and 10, with higher values corresponding to high levels of 
vulnerability. The variables used to calculate the vulnerability index are from World 
Development Indicators (2011). 
4. Results 
4.1. Results of baseline equation 
Table (1) shows the results of the effects of rainfall shocks on food insecurity with different 
econometric methods (ordinary least squared (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and random effects 
(RE)). OLS method (columns (1) and (2)) doesn’t take into account unobserved heterogeneity 
of countries; hence we apply fixed effects (FE) and random effect (RE) estimators. Finally, 
we keep fixed effect estimator (column 4) because the results of Hausman test shows that the 
fixed effect model is more appropriate than the random effect model.  
Economic development (income per capita) has a positive effect on food supply. Our results 
are similar to previous studies (e.g. (Smith & Haddad 2000). Indeed, the economic resource 
availabilities increase the capacity of countries to meet the food needs by acquiring through 
domestic production and import foods. The size of population reduces food supply. Our 
results follow previous authors ((Malthus 1992) who show that population growth can reduce 
food supply through a high pressure on agricultural resources and a negative effect on 
agricultural productivity. Contrary to previous authors ((Dreze & Sen 1991), we find that 
democratic institutions (polity 2) have no effect on food supply. This may be explained by the 
fact that we use a composite indicator.  
 Rainfall volatility has a negative and significant effect on food supply. These results 
can be explained by several arguments. Firstly, rainfall variability (for example droughts or 
flooding) is a source of high uncertainty on food production. This increases fluctuation in 
agriculture production and reduce household’s incomes. For countries that depend on the 
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weather conditions ((rain-fed agriculture) for agriculture production, rainfall variability has 
negative effect on food production and availability. Second, by reducing agriculture 
production in developing countries, rainfall volatility can have negative effect on economic 
growth ((Dell et al. 2008). These countries have low ability to purchase food on international 
markets (food import). In other words, rainfall volatility can reduce national food supply 
(food production and import) and increase food insecurity. 
 Table 1: Effects of climatic shocks on food security 
Dependent variable   Food Supply 
 
   
                            OLS 
(1) 
 
   (2) 
                 FE  
(3) 
 
   (4) 
                   RE 
(4) 
 
   (6) 
       
Rainfall volatility -0.0716*** -0.0912*** -0.417*** -0.365*** -0.0716** -0.0912*** 
 (-2.749) (-3.722) (-8.506) (-7.532) (-2.536) (-3.333) 
 
Rainfall -0.0764*** -0.0630*** -0.417*** -0.339*** -0.0764*** -0.0630*** 
 (-3.282) (-2.909) (-9.408) (-7.552) (-3.997) (-3.304) 
 
Income per capita 0.0178*** 0.0165*** 0.0172*** 0.0162*** 0.0178*** 0.0165*** 
 (3.395) (3.572) (5.095) (4.984) (5.916) (5.684) 
 
Population growth -9.688** -7.001* -2.827 -2.630 -9.688*** -7.001** 
 (-2.190) (-1.807) (-0.979) (-0.914) (-3.301) (-2.404) 
 
Democratic instititions 0.778 0.409 -0.219 -0.462 0.778 0.409 
 (0.862) (0.497) (-0.196) (-0.426) (0.687) (0.378) 
 
Intercept 454.0*** 414.3*** 872.1*** 757.5*** 454.0*** 414.3*** 
 (12.87) (11.91) (15.67) (13.28) (15.46) (13.96) 
       
 
Temporal dummies 
 
Observations 
 
No 
 
626 
 
Yes 
 
626 
 
No 
 
626 
 
Yes 
 
626 
 
No 
 
626 
 
Yes 
 
626 
 
Countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 
 
R-squared   0.216 0.289   
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008 
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Table 2: Effects of climatic shocks on food security: Adding control variables 
Dependent variable  
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
Food supply 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
(6) 
Rainfall volatility -0.365*** -0.336*** -0.318*** -0.332*** -0.361*** -0.372*** 
 (-7.532) (-6.878) (-6.395) (-6.695) (-7.440) (-4.570) 
Rainfall -0.339*** -0.313*** -0.296*** -0.307*** -0.406*** -0.344*** 
 (-7.552) (-6.943) (-6.444) (-6.682) (-6.006) (-4.355) 
Income per capita 0.0162*** 0.0160*** 0.0159*** 0.0168*** 0.0162*** 0.0143*** 
 (4.984) (4.981) (4.942) (5.188) (4.979) (3.550) 
Population growth -2.630 -2.740 -1.022 -2.301 -2.507 -11.13** 
 (-0.914) (-0.961) (-0.355) (-0.804) (-0.871) (-2.013) 
Democratic institutions -0.462 -0.374 -0.349 -0.419 -0.512 -2.950* 
 (-0.426) (-0.347) (-0.325) (-0.388) (-0.472) (-1.900) 
Cereal production  land  5.46e-
06*** 
    
  (3.408)     
Agricultural  land   2.003***    
   (3.683)    
Arable land    2.520***   
    (2.853)   
Rainfall squared     1.73e-05  
     (1.326)  
Exchange rate (REER)      0.000113 
      (0.230) 
Intercept 757.5*** 694.2*** 618.5*** 681.6*** 802.8*** 817.6*** 
 (13.28) (11.67) (9.112) (10.88) (12.08) (7.784) 
Observations 
Countries 
626 
71 
626 
71 
626 
71 
626 
71 
626 
71 
293 
33 
R-squared 0.289 0.304 0.306 0.300 0.291 0.317 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   
coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008 
 
 
 
 
The next step (table 2) consists of adding other control variables to check the 
robustness of results to changes in the baseline model: agricultural variables (Cereal 
production land, agricultural land and arable land) and squared term of rainfall level. Results 
show that rainfall volatility has a negative effect on food supply. The coefficient associated to 
rainfall volatility is negative and significant. Land for cereal production (column 2), 
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agriculture land (column 3) and arable land (column 4) contribute to food supply. A policy 
allowing better land use increases food production and supply. 
In previous columns, we found a negative effect of rainfall level on food supply. In 
column 5, we include a squared term of rainfall level and test a non linear relationship 
between rainfall level and food supply. We can suppose that too much rainfall reduce food 
supply. The results are not signicant5 suggesting that a negative effect of rainfall on food 
supply. 
4.2. Heterogeneity on the effect of climatic shocks 
In this section, we identify the potential heterogeneities in the relationship between climatic 
shocks and food security.  First, we focus on the impact conditional on the civil conflicts. 
Second, we analyze whether the vulnerability to climatic shocks could modify the marginal 
impact of climatic shocks on food security. Finally, we look at the effects of climatic shocks 
in a context of food prices vulnerability.  
4.2.1. The importance of civil conflicts 
The hypothesis tested is that the effect of climatic shocks on food insecurity is high for 
countries that are in conflict. In table 3, we add civil conflicts in column (2) and interative 
term (Rainfall volatility * Civil conflict) in column (3).  Results (column (2)) show that civil 
conflicts have negative effect on food supply. Indeed, civil conflicts can negatively affect 
harvests and reduce active population in the agricultural sector because the armed leaders can 
recruit farmers by offering them high incomes. This leads to a decrease in food availability 
through the collapse of agricultural production.  
 
We also find that the effect of rainfall volatility on food supply is more important for the 
countries in conflict (column 3). A characteristic of civil conflicts is its negative effect on 
market access, political and social networks. First, they destroy infrastructure, social services, 
assets and livelihoods, displace populations, social cohesion, institutions and norms and create 
fear and distrust. In addition, civil conflicts disrupt farming systems (irrigation schemes) and 
production (crop production, livestock production and off-farm activities) operated by 
households. Second, market disruption increases difficulties of households in getting to 
markets to sell and buy goods, and the loss of earnings capacity, savings and formal and 
informal risk-sharing networks. Third civil conflicts have negative effects on economic 
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growth by reducing investments, economic infrastructures. This can considerably reduce 
government’s revenues (e.g tax revenue) and significantly weaken its ability to “invest in 
people”, for instance to provide better nutrition, and on-the-job training that would lead to 
improved living conditions. These effects can be factors of poverty trap ((Kremer & Miguel 
2007), increasing vulnerability and food insecurity.  
Climatic shocks are likely to increase this vulnerability and dampen livelihoods of households 
affected by civil conflicts. Indeed the destruction of assets caused by civil conflicts, as well as 
unstable economic, social and political environments, will impact significantly the ability of 
countries to face to climatic shocks.  In other words the effects of climatic shocks on food 
supply are more severe with civil conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Effects of climatic shocks on food security: the importance of civil conflict 
Dependent variable  
 
(1) 
Food supply 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
    
Rainfall volatility -0.365*** -0.374*** -0.372*** 
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 (-7.532) (-7.612) (-7.583) 
 
Rainfall -0.339*** -0.345*** -0.344*** 
 (-7.552) (-7.623) (-7.618) 
 
Rainfall volatility * Civil conflict   -0.415** 
   (-1.990) 
 
Civil conflict  -34.67*** -52.29*** 
  (-2.804) (-3.445) 
 
Income per capita 0.0162*** 0.0155*** 0.0153*** 
 (4.984) (4.749) (4.701) 
 
Population growth -2.630 -3.484 -3.626 
 (-0.914) (-1.200) (-1.252) 
 
Democratic institutions -0.462 -0.211 -0.128 
 (-0.426) (-0.193) (-0.118) 
 
Intercept 757.5*** 768.8*** 768.1*** 
 (13.28) (13.35) (13.37) 
    
 
Observations 
 
Number of countries 
 
 
626 
 
71 
 
617 
 
71 
 
617 
 
71 
R-squared 0.289 0.295 0.301 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   
coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Effects of climatic shocks on food security: the importance of climate 
vulnerability 
Dependent variable    Food 
supply 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Rainfall volatility -0.365*** -0.308*** -0.366*** -0.358*** -0.363*** 
 (-7.532) (-4.981) (-7.343) (-7.127) (-7.328) 
 
Rainfall -0.339*** -0.335*** -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.339*** 
 (-7.552) (-7.453) (-7.545) (-7.541) (-7.541) 
 
Rainfall volatility * Climate vulnerability1  -0.00215    
  (-1.500) 
 
   
Income per capita 0.0162*** 0.0161*** 0.0162*** 0.0163*** 0.0162*** 
 (4.984) (4.949) (4.974) (4.999) (4.985) 
 
Population growth -2.630 -2.882 -2.626 -2.581 -2.602 
 (-0.914) (-1.001) (-0.910) (-0.895) (-0.902) 
 
Democratic institutions -0.462 -0.516 -0.461 -0.458 -0.457 
 (-0.426) (-0.476) (-0.424) (-0.422) (-0.421) 
 
Rainfall volatility * Climate vulnerability2   0.000138   
   (0.0374) 
 
  
Rainfall volatility * Climate vulnerability3    -0.00121  
    (-0.535) 
 
 
Rainfall volatility * Climate vulnerability4     -0.00154 
     (-0.231) 
 
Intercept 757.5*** 752.8*** 757.6*** 757.1*** 757.3*** 
 (13.28) (13.19) (13.26) (13.26) (13.26) 
 
      
Observations 
 
Number of countries 
626 
 
71 
 
626 
 
71 
626 
 
71 
626 
 
71 
626 
 
71 
R-squared 0.289 0.292 0.289 0.289 0.289 
Climate Vulnerability (1)…(4) correspond respectively to cdi (climate drivers: extreme  weather, sea level rise and agricultural productivity 
loss), cv( climate vulnerability: climate drivers weather adjusted for income and Regulation) , wcdi (extreme weathers only: floods, droughts, 
extreme heat, wind storms and wild fires) and wcv (extreme weather adjusted for income and Regulation). Note: t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
The study period is 1960-2008. 
 
 
 
4.2.2. The role of Climate vulnerability 
Previous subsection put in light the conditional effect of climatic shocks on food supply of 
countries under conflicts. Climatic shocks reduce food supply of countries under conflicts.  
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In addition to political vulnerability, we analyze whether the climatic vulnerability of 
countries could modify the marginal impact of climatic shocks on food security. 
According to (Wheeler 2011), countries are vulnerable to climate change if they meet the 
following three criteria: (i) High vulnerability to changes in extreme weather, sea level rise 
(risk from sea level rise) and agricultural productivity loss; (ii) Low income and (iii) High 
size of population. A low level of climatic indicator means that countries are more vulnerable 
and are less resilient to climate events. We can suppose a high effect of climatic shocks on 
food supply for countries that are vulnerable to climate change. Results of table (column (2) 
to (5)) show that climatic vulnerability of countries doesn’t modify the marginal impact of 
climatic shocks on food supply. In other words, the effects of climatic shocks on food supply 
are not different for countries that are more vulnerable to climate change. Our results are 
counterintuitive and can be explained by the fact the data of Wheeler (2011) are available for 
one year (2008). 
4.2.3. The importance of food price shocks vulnerability 
The last hypothesis tested is the potential effects of climatic shocks on food supply in 
a context of food prices vulnerability. Climatic shocks can increase vulnerability of countries 
to food price shocks. Indeed climatic shocks could inﬂuence agricultural productivity and 
production that are important in household’s revenues in developing countries. As the 
household’s incomes (from agriculture) are negatively affected by climatic shocks, the part of 
food expenses on total consumption (food dependency) increases. Moreover, by affecting 
economic growth ((Dell et al. 2008), climatic shocks can lower the resources capacities and 
increase food import burden of countries. Hence the negative effect of climatic shocks on 
food supply can increase with vulnerability of countries to food price shocks.  
 Results are shown in table 5. Column 2 presents the results of the nonlinear effect of 
climatic shocks on food supply, depending upon the level of vulnerability of countries to food 
price shocks. Results indicate that the associated coefficients of additive (climatic shocks) and 
the interactive terms (rainfall volatility*vulnerability of countries to food price shocks) are 
negative and significant. This result reveals that the negative effect of climatic shocks on food 
supply increases with the level of vulnerability of countries to food price shocks. Countries 
that are more vulnerable to food prices shocks are less able to maintain food supply. These 
results can be explained by the fact that vulnerable countries have very little policy space and 
limited fiscal and administrative capacity to organize safety nets to import food and protect 
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their population from climatic shocks ((De Janvry & Sadoulet 2008). Indeed, policy 
instruments available to facilitate food accessibility by increasing agricultural production or 
imports are limited or ineffective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Effects of climatic shocks on food security: the role of Vulnerability to food 
price shocks 
Dependent variable  Food supply 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Rainfall volatility -0.365*** -0.287*** -0.210*** -0.183*** 
 (-7.532) (-5.278) (-3.767) (-3.132) 
 
Price vulnerability  -0.557*** -0.476*** -0.467*** 
  (-6.359) (-5.426) (-4.938) 
 
Rainfall volatility * Price vulnerability  -0.000721* -0.000901** -0.00107*** 
  (-1.832) (-2.331) (-2.714) 
 
Rainfall  -0.339*** -0.287*** -0.222*** -0.202*** 
 (-7.552) (-5.974) (-4.519) (-3.859) 
 
Food price   0.167*** 0.107** 
   (4.461) (2.128) 
 
Price volatility    0.146 
    (1.381) 
 
Income per capita 0.0162*** 0.00728** 0.00480 0.00415 
 (4.984) (2.134) (1.420) (1.194) 
 
Population growth -2.630 -11.15*** -7.048* -6.002 
 (-0.914) (-2.684) (-1.692) (-1.373) 
 
Democratic institutions -0.462 -0.984 -0.746 -0.290 
 (-0.426) (-0.891) (-0.690) (-0.269) 
 
Intercept 757.5*** 783.1*** 667.0*** 650.4*** 
 (13.28) (13.21) (10.50) (9.662) 
     
 
Observations 
 
Number of countries 
 
 
626 
 
71 
 
500 
 
69 
 
500 
 
69 
 
470 
 
69 
R-squared 0.289 0.365 0.394 0.364 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   
coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008 
 
 
4.3. Robustness  
Five robustness checks have been implemented.  
4.3.1. Alternative indicators of climatic shocks 
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First, the effect of climatic shocks on food supply in a context of food prices vulnerability was 
re-examined with two alternative indicators of rainfall volatility. Rainfall instability is defined 
as the absolute deviation of the yearly average of rainfall from its own trend (long term mean 
of rainfall 1960-2008). It supposes that rainfall series have a deterministic trend. Because 
rainfall is unpredictable, we hypothesize that rainfall series run a stochastic trend. We 
compute and test rainfall volatility (columns 3 and 4 of table), defined as the 5-year rolling 
standard deviation of the growth rate of rainfall series. Moreover we use rainfall series from 
another source ((Mitchell et al. 2004) in columns 5 and 6. Whatever the indicators used, 
results reveal that the negative effect of climatic shocks on food supply increases with the 
level of vulnerability of countries to food price shocks. 
4.3.2. Inertia of food supply 
Another issue is to analyze if food supply in developing countries is characterized by inertia 
phenomena. In other words, does lagged level of food supply is a determinant of the current 
level of food supply? We include this variable (lagged level of food supply) in our baseline 
equation. The dynamic nature of the specified model requires system-GMM estimation (one 
step and two steps). Columns (2) and (3) of table show that the lagged level of food supply 
has no effect on its current level. There is not an inertia phenomena for food supply in 
developing countries.  
 Table 6: Alternative indicators of climatic shocks 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008 
 
Dependent variable Food supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
 
  
Tendance  
stochastique 
  
Mitchell et al 
 
       
Rainfall volatility -0.358*** -0.277*** -0.129*** -0.268*** -0.380*** -0.0514*** 
 (-7.371) (-5.048) (-5.030) (-3.610) (-3.530) (-4.610) 
Price vulnerability  -0.562*** -0.464*** -0.427*** -0.557*** -0.469*** 
  (-6.391) (-4.968) (-4.521) (-5.337) (-4.071) 
Rainfall volatility * Price vulnerability  -0.000771**  -0.00873**  -0.00772* 
  (-1.976)  (-2.134)  (-1.790) 
Rainfall -0.336*** -0.284*** 0.00999 0.00820 0.00642 0.00366 
 (-7.410) (-5.837) (0.615) (0.507) (0.441) (0.251) 
Income per capita 0.0162*** 0.00713** -0.00689* -0.00663* -0.00119 -0.00113 
 (5.004) (2.099) (-1.941) (-1.877) (-1.514) (-1.433) 
Population growth -2.396 -10.85*** 4.172 2.327 0.775 0.300 
 (-0.813) (-2.614) (0.966) (0.531) (0.251) (0.0971) 
Democratic institutions 0.141 0.0768 0.137 0.0571 0.754 0.679 
 (0.134) (0.0728) (0.144) (0.0601) (1.256) (1.132) 
Intercept 754.1*** 779.7*** 444.7*** 446.8*** 449.1*** 449.2*** 
 (13.08) (13.01) (18.86) (19.03) (24.56) (24.63) 
       
Observations 626 500 434 434 544 544 
R-squared 0.285 0.362 0.347 0.355 0.186 0.192 
Number of countries 71 69 69 69 69 69 
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Table 7: Inertia of food supply 
Dependent variable                                                  Food Supply 
 Fixed Effect 
 
(1) 
GMM-System One 
step 
(2) 
GMM-System  
Two step 
(3) 
 
Lag of.Food supply 
  
0.02 
 
0.04 
  (1.612) (1.01) 
 
Rainfall volatility -0.362*** -0.0214*** -0.0215*** 
 (-7.528) (-23.61) (-22.07) 
 
Rainfall -0.337*** -0.000852 0.000133 
 (-7.431) (-0.160) (0.0218) 
 
Income per capita 0.0163*** 0.000648 0.00118 
 (5.008) (0.535) (0.849) 
 
Population growth -2.383 8.944 8.369 
 (-0.806) (1.518) (1.201) 
 
Democratic institutions -0.184 -1.128* -0.631 
 (-0.169) (-1.953) (-1.065) 
 
Intercept 754.6*** -28.95 -16.69 
 (13.09) (-1.009) (-0.548) 
    
Observations 626 567 567 
R-squared 0.287   
Countries 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Hansen test 
Instruments 
71 
 
71 
0.00 
0.26 
0.34 
57 
71 
0.00 
0.25 
0.34 
57 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   
coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008. 
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4.3.3. Complementary indicator of food security 
Second, because food security is a multidimensional concept, we use another complementary 
indicator used in the literature: the proportion of undernourished people in the total 
population. A person is malnourished if his average energy intake is less than the minimum 
necessary to maintain physical and moderate activity. Following the economic literature, we 
construct a model of the malnutrition explained by income per capita, population growth, 
democratic institutions and the level of rainfall. 
Table () presents result of the effect of climatic shocks on the proportion of undernourished 
population (basic equation). We find that rainfall volatility increases the proportion of 
undernourished population. Results are robust by adding other control variables (rainfall 
square, agricultural land, arable land, cereal production land, food prices and food price 
volatility). 
An interesting question is to see if food supply can be a factor by which climatic shocks affect 
proportion of undernourished population. In indeed, food supply can be an important factor th at 
comfort the access of people to food. In other words, by reducing food supply, climatic shocks 
aggravate malnutrition. To test this hypothesis, we include in the baseline equation, the 
transmission channel (food supply) allowing climatic shocks to affect indirectly the 
proportion of total undernourished population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8: Effect of climatic shocks on Proportion of total undernourished population 
Dependent variable                                                                                    Percentage of total undernourished population     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rainfall Volatility 0.0528*** 0.0514*** 0.0320** 0.0354** 0.0475*** 0.0499*** 0.0495*** 
 (3.375) (3.273) (2.124) (2.285) (3.056) (2.726) (2.730) 
Rainfall 0.0524*** 0.0588*** 0.0372** 0.0417** 0.0567*** 0.0492*** 0.0483** 
 (3.287) (3.401) (2.245) (2.453) (3.326) (2.603) (2.580) 
Income per capita -0.000172 -0.000125 -0.000880* -0.000689 -0.000239 -8.25e-05 -0.000154 
 (-0.327) (-0.237) (-1.728) (-1.323) (-0.458) (-0.151) (-0.290) 
Population  growth 0.611* 0.568 0.519 0.707** 0.554 0.476 0.519 
 (1.657) (1.528) (1.496) (1.977) (1.514) (1.165) (1.313) 
Democratic institutions 0.105 0.0957 0.0988 0.130 0.0884 0.121 0.0951 
 (0.767) (0.695) (0.769) (0.981) (0.652) (0.822) (0.665) 
Rainfall square  -1.91e-06 -1.52e-06 -1.93e-06 -2.32e-06   
  (-0.956) (-0.811) (-1.006) (-1.175)   
Agricultural land   -0.607***    -0.0131 
   (-5.851)    (-1.274) 
Arable land    -0.644***   -38.39* 
    (-4.569)   (-1.779) 
Cereal production land      -1.09e-06***   
     (-2.792)   
Food prices      -0.00732  
      (-1.215)  
Food prices volatility 
 
      -0.0131 
      (-1.274) 
Intercept -41.52** -45.24** 7.725 -14.55 -35.93* -38.02* -38.39* 
 (-2.276) (-2.425) (0.393) (-0.762) (-1.923) (-1.753) (-1.779) 
Observations 314 314 314 314 314 282 287 
Countries 79 79 79 79 79 71 74 
R-squared 0.157 0.160 0.271 0.231 0.188 0.378 0.141 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008
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Table 9: Channel of food supply 
Dependent variable                  Percentage of total undernourished population 
 (1) (2) 
Rainfall Volatility 0.0528*** 0.0100 
 (3.375) (0.581) 
Rainfall 0.0524*** 0.00561 
 (3.287) (0.303) 
Income per capita -0.000172 0.000889* 
 (-0.327) (1.658) 
Population  growth 0.611* 0.411 
 (1.657) (1.158) 
Democratic institutions 0.105 0.120 
 (0.767) (0.947) 
Food supply   -0.0728*** 
(-7.043) 
Intercept  -38.39* 
  (-1.779) 
   
Observations 294 287 
Countries 74 74 
R-squared 0.152 0.141 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated   
coefficient at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. The study period is 1960-2008 
In column (2), we include food supply. We find that food supply has a negative effect on 
malnutrition. Moreover, the coefficient of climatic shocks becomes no significant.  The non 
significance of the coefficient associated with climatic shocks indicates that climatic shocks 
increase malnutrition through food supply. By increasing malnutrition through food supply, 
climatic shocks are source of food insecurity.  
4.3.4. Heterogeneity for African countries 
Finally, we look at if the effects of climatic shocks on food supply are different for Sub 
Saharan Africa countries. Indeed these countries have two characteristic: (1) they are more 
vulnerable to food prices shocks because they are net food importers and they are less 
resilient; (2) they are more vulnerable to climate change. The predominance of rain-fed 
agriculture in much of Sub-Saharan African results in food systems that are highly sensitive to 
rainfall variability. Moreover (Guillaumont & Simonet 2011) and (Wheeler 2011)5 conclude 
that these countries are the most vulnerable to climate change. 
Table (10) shows the results of the effect of rainfall instability on food supply in Sub Sahara 
countries and developing countries. Columns (1) and (3) show that the negative effect of 
                                                          
5
 Wheeler (2011) shows that, in the top 25 states, 19 are from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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climatic shocks is higher in SSA than in other developing countries. Moreover for Sub-
Saharan Africa (column (4)), the adverse effect of climatic shocks on food supply is high in a 
context of food prices vulnerability. 
  
Table 10: Heterogeneity for African Countries 
Dependent Variable                                                                 Food Supply 
      Developing Countrieses 
             (1)   
 
(2) 
African 
Countries 
(3) 
 
(4) 
     
Rainfall volatility -0.358*** -0.277*** -0.554*** -0.631*** 
 (-7.371) (-5.048) 
 
(-5.986) (-4.371) 
Price vulnerability  -0.562***  -0.426*** 
  (-6.391) 
 
 (-2.919) 
Rainfall volatility*Price 
vulnerability 
   -
0.000771** 
  
-0.00139* 
  (-1.976) 
 
 (-1.805) 
Rainfall -0.336*** -0.284*** -0.570*** -0.721*** 
 (-7.410) (-5.837) 
 
(-7.072) (-7.199) 
Income per capita 0.0162*** 0.00713** 0.0256*** 0.00900 
 (5.004) (2.099) 
 
(3.010) (0.465) 
Population growth -2.396 -10.85*** 5.322 16.35** 
 (-0.813) (-2.614) 
 
(1.452) (2.467) 
Democratic institutions 0.141 0.0768 -0.00778 -0.0403 
 (0.134) (0.0728) 
 
(-0.00474) (-0.0223) 
Intercept 754.1*** 779.7*** 772.9*** 952.8*** 
 (13.08) (13.01) (9.689) (10.20) 
     
Observations 626 
 
500 230 164 
Number of  countries 
 
R-squared 
71 
 
0.285 
69 
 
0.362 
25 
 
0.253 
24 
 
0.369 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated coefficient at 
1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Temporal dummies are included. The study period is 1960-2007. 
 
4.3.5. Asymmetric and extreme events effects 
Previous results analyse the impact of rainfall volatility but are silent about their asymmetric 
and extreme events effects on food supply. Indeed previous results could mask important 
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differences on the effects of positive and negative rainfall volatility on food supply. In column 
(2) of table 12, we present the results of negative and positive rainfall shocks on food supply. 
Results suggest that negative rainfall shocks are associated with food supply reduction 
whereas positive rainfall shocks are associated with food supply improvement.  However the 
shocks are asymmetric because the losses due to negative shocks are not perfectly 
compensated by the gains during the positive shocks. 
Column (3) indicates that extreme rainfall volatility has a negative impact of food supply. The 
effect of extreme rainfall shocks is almost 34 times higher than the effect of normal rainfall 
shocks. In other words, high rainfall volatility has extreme adverse effect on food supply. 
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Table 12: Asymmetric and extreme rainfall shocks  
 
 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses under the estimated coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance of the estimated  
coefficient  at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Temporal dummies are included. The study period is 1960-2008. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on climatic variability and food security. It 
analyzes the effect of climatic shocks on food security for 77 developing countries from 1960 
to 2008. The results are as follows: First, we show that climatic shocks have negative effects 
on food security.  Using two complementary indicators of food security, we find that climatic 
shocks reduce food supply in developing countries. The adverse effect is higher for African 
Sub Saharan countries than other developing countries.  Moreover, food supply is a channel 
by which climatic shocks increase the proportion of undernourished people.  Second, the 
negative effect of climatic shocks is exacerbated in presence of civil conflicts. Third, the 
effects are high for countries that vulnerable to food prices shocks.  
 Food Supply 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rainfall Volatility -0.365*** 
(-7.485) 
  
 
Positive shocks  
  
0.21*** 
 
  (4.890)  
Negative shocks  -0.398***  
  (-6.711)  
Extreme Rainfall shocks   -12.36** 
   (-2.388) 
Rainfall -0.343*** -0.339*** -0.00678 
 (-7.542) (-7.407) (-0.393) 
Income per capita 0.0159*** 0.0157*** -0.00287 
 (4.935) (4.864) (-0.785) 
Population growth -2.453 -2.549 4.252 
 (-0.831) (-0.863) (1.566) 
Democratic institutions -0.646 -0.678 -0.0568 
 (-0.639) (-0.670) (-0.0606) 
Intercept 762.7*** 746.8*** 437.9*** 
 (13.20) (12.45) (17.46) 
    
Observations 626 626 461 
R-squared 0.285 0.286 0.179 
Countries 71 71 71 
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Our results are important for economic policies. An important intervention to reduce food 
insecurity would be the implementation of effective mitigation strategies of risks. In line with 
this, promoting measures that enhance the food production systems in the developing 
countries thereby increasing their capacity to withstand the rainfall instability is imperative. 
One approach would be to invest in agricultural research, extension, and methods for reducing 
food production losses related to climate variability. Given the large uncertainties about future 
rainfall patterns in many developing countries, careful consideration should be given to major 
investments in infrastructure to support irrigation and water resources development in order to 
limit the effects of food production reducing.  
Another approach, probably important for international community, is to help developing 
countries, particularly the least developing countries (LDCs) through automatic mechanisms 
which will be lead to magnitude of effects of climatic shocks on food security. For example, 
the international community can finance stabilization mechanisms (government budget or 
development projects for the regions adversely affected by climatic shocks) with aid (named 
“climatic aid”). When the effect of climatic shocks is negative and more important, the level 
of “climatic aid” will have to increase. This “climatic aid” can be given to developing 
countries that are both more exposure to effects of climate change and vulnerable to food 
price shocks.    
The third way to reduce the magnitude of effects of climatic shocks in the developing 
countries is to diversify the structure of their economy.  
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Appendix B: Tables 
Table B.1: Variables definition and sources 
Variables Definition  Source 
Food supply Food supply refers to the total amount of the 
commodity available as human food during the 
reference period. Food supply are the total of food 
Production + food import- food exports+ food stocks 
variation. 
FAO (2011) 
Percentage of total 
undernourished 
population 
The percentage of the population whose food intake 
is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements 
continuously. 
WDI (2011) 
Rainfall volatility It is the absolute deviation of the yearly average 
of rainfall from its own trend (long term mean of 
rainfall 1950-2008). 
Guillaumont and 
Simonet (2011) 
Rainfall It is the yearly average of rainfall. Guillaumont et 
Simonet (2011) 
Food Price The food price index is a geometrically average of  
 
the world  price  of the following foods:maize, 
rice, sugar, soybean, soybean oil, sorgho and 
wheat.  
 
Authors  from WDI 
(2011) 
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Food Price 
vulnerability 
The FPV index  is a weigted6 average of the 
following variables: the ratio of food imports to 
total household consumption; the ratio of total food 
imports to total imports of goods and services and 
the inverse of the level of GDP per capita. 
AuthorsWorld 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
Civil conflicts Civil conflicts are defined as the magnitude score 
of episode(s) of civil warfare involving  that state 
in that year. 
(Center for Systemic 
Peace 2010) 
Climatic 
Vulnerability 
It is an index that show where extreme climate 
events (weather-related disasters, rising seas, and 
the loss of agricultural productivity) are most 
likely to occur, and the likelihood that an 
individual in each country would be affected 
Wheeler 2011) 
Income per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita WDI (2011) 
Population growth annual population growth rate WDI (2011) 
Democratic 
institutions 
The Polity Score captures the regime authority 
spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). 
Polity IV (2010) 
Agricultural land Agriculture area as percentage of total land area WDI (2011) 
Arable land Arable area as percentage of total land area WDI (2011) 
Cereal production 
land 
Cereal
7
 production area refers to harvested area or 
Land under cereal production 
WDI (2011) 
 
 
Table B.2: List of countries 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Food supply 389.04 153.74 18.63 1318.99 
Rainfall volatility -0.89 91.53 -471.73 632 
Rainfall  1200.57 812.04 16.81 3882.82 
Shock price vulnerability 46.15 64.45 0.84 381.48 
Civil conflict 0.03 0.33 0 4 
Per capita GDP 6396.13 10374.16 84.28 95885.27 
                                                          
6
 To calculate  this index, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) applied to three 
variables.  
7
 Cereals include wheat, rice, maize, barley, oats, rye, millet, sorghum, buckwheat and mixed 
grains.   
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Population growth 1.88 1.54 -4.64 16.24 
Democratic institutions -0.52 5.64 -10 10 
Land under cereal production 2.22e+07 7.10e+07 0 6.95e+08 
Agricultural land 37.67 21.19 0 90.55 
Arable land 13.30 12.94 0 71.65 
Agricultural irrigated land 10.56 13.73 0 71.58 
Undernourished population 15.32 13.71 5 70 
 
 
Table B.3: List of countries  
Albania Honduras Nicaragua 
Argentina Croatia Nepal 
Azerbaijan Haiti Pakistan 
Burundi Indonesia Panama 
Burkina Faso India Peru 
Bangladesh Iran Philippine 
Bulgaria Jamaica Paraguay 
Bolivia Kenya Rwanda 
Brazil Kowait Sudan 
Botswana Liberia Senegal 
Chile Libya El Salvador 
China Sri Lanka Syria 
Cote d'Ivoire Lithuania Togo 
Cameroon Morocco Thailand 
Colombia Moldavia Trinidad and Tobago 
Costa Rica Madagascar Tanzania 
Algeria Mexica Uganda 
Ecuador Mali Ukraine 
Egypt Mongolia Uruguay 
Ethiopia Mozambique Venezuela 
Fiji Mauritania South Africa 
Gabon Malaysia Zambia 
Ghana Niger Zimbabwe 
Guatemala Nigeria   
 
 
